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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
ROMNEY LU1fBER COMPANY, a Case No. 8469 
corporation, and BOARD OF EDU-
CATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
a public corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITION AND BRIEF ON REHEARING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the plaintiff, appellant, and petitioner, 
in the above entitled proceedings, and respectfully moves 
and petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing and 
reconsideration of its former decision heretofore render-
ed in such cause under date of May 8th, 1956, upon the 
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grounds, and for the reasons that this Honorable Court 
erred in its determination and decision of said cause, 
that it misconstrued or misapplied the existing law ap-
plicable to said cause, or failed to give due consideration 
to important relevant facts and law, in the following par-
ticulars: 
POINT I. 
THAT THIS HONORABLE •COURT ERRED IN AFFIRM-
ING THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER ENTERING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, UPON THE FOLLOWING 
GROUNDS: 
(A) THAT THE STATUTE APPLICABLE TO THE 
PRE-SURVEY SETTLEMENT OF POTENTIAL SCHOOL 
SECTION WAS THE ACT OF 1859 RATHER THAN THE 
ACT OF 1891. 
(B) IN HOLDING THAT CONGRESSIONAL ACTS 
APPLICABLE, GRANTED AN "IN PRAESENTI" RIGHT 
TO THE TERRITORY TO PRE-SURVEY, POTENTIAL, 
SCHOOL SECTION, RATHER THAN AS A DIVESTMENT 
OF THE SAME. 
(C) THAT PATENT WAS REQUIRED TO EXTIN-
GUISH THE TERRITORY'S RIGHTS TO 1i. PRE-SURVEY, 
SETTLED, POTENTIAL, SCHOOL SECTION. 
(D) THAT NO DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BY THE 
·COURT AS BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES OF ADVERSE 
CLAIMANTS: 
(1) As to Conflicts between Settlers; 
(2) Paramount Authority of Congress To Grant to 
Others or Retain Rights in Land Where Settle-
ment Rights are Not Vested. 
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THAT THIS HONORABLE ·COURT ERRED IN AFFIRM-
ING THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER ENTERING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, UPON THE FOLLOWING 
GROUNDS: 
(A) THAT THE STATUTE APPLICABLE TO THE 
PRE-SURVEY SETTLEMENT OF POTENTIAL SCHOOL 
SECTION WAS THE ACT OF 1859 RATHER THAN THE 
ACT OF 1891. 
This Honorable Court in its opinion of May 8th, 
1956, quotes the statutory enactment of the United 
States Congress of 1859 (11 Statutes 385, 26 February, 
1859, Section 2275 of Revised Statutes of the United 
States of 1875) as follows: 
"Where settlements, with a view to pre-
emption, have been made before the survey of the 
lands in the field, which are found to have been 
made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those se·c-
tions shall be subject to the pre-emption claim of 
such settler, and, if they, or either of them, have 
been or shall be reserved or pledged for the use 
of schools or colleges in the State or Territory 
where the lands lie, other lands of like quantity 
are appropriated in lieu of such as may be 
patented by pre-emptors * * *" 
and assumes that as it was the statute in effect nearest 
to the 1856 date of survey of the lands in controversy 
between the parties to this suit (See p.age 2, Appellant's 
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Original Brief, Section "B", Statement of Facts as to 
Material Events), that the terms of such statute are the 
applicable and controlling terms to be applied herein. 
Yet, note, that while the Court applies the 1859 
statute, retrospectively, it failed to consider .and apply 
the 1891 Statute (Section 2275, Revised Statutes of the 
United States as amended by Act of February 28th, 1891, 
26 Statutes at Large, page 796, 51 Congress, Session II, 
[See also Page 9 Appellant's Original Brief], which 
reads as follows: 
"Where settlements with .a view to pre-
emption or homestead have been or shall here-
after be made, before the survey of the lands in 
the field, which are found to have been made on 
Sections sixteen and thirty-six, those sections 
shall be subject to the claims of such settlers ; and 
if such sections or either of them shall be granted, 
reserved, or platted for the use of schools or col-
leges in the state or territory in which they lie, 
other lands of equal acreage are hereby appro-
priated and granted, and may be selected by said 
state or territory, in lieu of such land as may be 
thus taken by pre-emption or homestead settlers." 
As indicated at page 9 of Appellant's Original Brief, 
this act of 1891, was by Act of May 3rd, 1902, Public Law 
102, Chap. 183, 32 Statutes at Large Page 188, 57th Con-
gress, Ch. 683, made applicable to Utah, .anything to the 
contrary in the enabling act, notwithstanding. 
And, as will hereinafter be den1onstrated, the appli-
cable terms of the 1891 Act rather than the 1859 Act of 
Congress are the applicable statutory terms to govern, 
likewise applied, retrospectively, for, as shown in the 
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quoted extract of the Shepley v. Cowan case, 91 U.S. 330, 
23 L. Ed. 424, as set out in the Gonzales v. French case, 
164 U.S. 338, 17 Sup. Ct. 85, 41 L. Ed. 458, the federal 
supreme court, has held in effect that the national con-
gress, may at .any time before pre-emption or other rights 
vest, or patent is issued, legislate concerning or affecting 
the public domain, settled or otherwise. That is exactly 
what it did in the 1891 Act, and, since no "vested" rights 
intervened, as to either state, territory, or any invididual, 
the congress was within its rights. Hence, the 1891 act 
rather than the 1859 .act, is the governing statute, and 
failure to so hold, is and was erroneous, and as will here-
after be shown, adversely affected the rights of this 
petitioner. 
(B) IN HOLDING THAT CONGRESSIONAL A·CTS 
APPLICABLE, GRANTED AN "IN PRAESENTI" RIGHT 
TO THE TERRITORY TO PRE-SURVEY, POTENTIAL, . 
SCHOOL SECTION, RATHER THAN AS A DIVESTMENT 
OF THE SAME. 
As above pointed out in subpoint "A", a reading of 
the 1859 and 1891 .acts present a considerably different 
situation, as delineated by the wording of each. 
Note that the language of the 1859 statute provides 
for the lieu lands only as to such pre-settled land, as may 
be afterwards "patented by pre-emptors", whereas the 
later 1891 act provides for lieu lands as to l.ands "subject 
to the claims of such settlers," a vital, and distinctly 
different idea. Consequently, judged under the 1891 act, 
a different holding would necessarily follow as to the 
extinguishment of the territorial rights to section six-
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teen lands, where settlement thereon was made prior to 
the survey thereof, since, neither settlement by pre-
emptors or patent of the lands, as required by the earlier 
act, are any longer made requisites under the later act. 
See also in this connection argument commencing at top 
of page 10 of Appellant's Original Brief. 
And, the correctness of the above reasoning, is, in an 
opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Washing-
ton, .at least hinted at, in the following language, respect-
ing the question of whether the school land grants to that 
state were present grants by the terms of the statute, 
or future grants, when the same have yet to be surveyed: 
" ( 4) * * * However, if title to the particular 
lands in question did not vest in the state upon 
its admission to the Union, and has not since then 
vested in the state, because of pre-emption and 
homestead claims initiated by settlement prior to 
government survey, because of the creation of 
national forest reservations, * * *" Page 402 
Pacific, Thompson v. Savidge, 188 Pacific Re-
porter 397, 110 Washington 486. 
It is therefore submitted, that in accordance with 
the above case, the cases therein cited of Heydenfeldt v. 
Daney Gold, etc., Co., 93 U.S. 634, 23 L. Ed. 995, as ex-
plained in United States v. llJorrison, 240 U.S. 192, 36 
Sup. Ct. 326, 60 L. Ed. 599; that the Territory of Utah 
did not receive any interest in the instant section six-
teen as asserted in the Court's original opinion herein, 
and, which, as under the 1859 Act, might have been re-
garded as a possibility. 
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~r 1 (C) THAT PATENT WAS REQUIRED TO EXTIN-
GUISH THE TERRITORY'S RIGHTS TO A PRE-SURVEY, 
SETTLED, POTENTIAL, SCHOOL SECTION. 
It is submitted, that on the ,authorities, and reason-
ing as set out in Subpoint "B", above, that, the 1891 con-
gressional act, being controlling, would not theref~re 
require that the extinguishment of territorial rights be 
based solely in situations where a "pre-emptor" obtained 
a patent, as may have been the case under the 1859 .act, 
and, therefore, to limit the appellant to the narrow 
situation where a final, later patent should actually be 
had, is erroneous. 
And, in ,a further respect, it is believed that the 
Court's decision is in error, since, if under its holding, 
the patent is the sine qua non without which extinguish-
ment of the territorial or state rights to the section can-
not be had, the result of the holding is to bar the appel-
lant and petitioner herein, from proceeding under the 
federal remedial act, as hereinafter mentioned, and as 
set out at p.age 18 of Appellant's Original Brief, to secure 
that very patent which is the essence of the purported 
extinguishment required. 
(D) THAT NO DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BY THE 
COURT AS BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES OF ADVERSE 
CLAIMANTS: 
(1) As to Conflicts between Settlers; 
(2) Paramount Authority of Congress to Grant to 
Others or Retain Rights in Land Where Settle-
ment Rights are Not Vested. 
The Court quotes the language of Shepley v. Cowan, 
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91 U.S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 424, as quoted in Gonzales v. 
French, 164 U.S. 338, 17 Sup. Ct. 85, 41 L. Ed. 458, as 
indicative of the fact that no vested rights are acquired 
by a settler until compliance with the requirements of 
the statutes. That is true, in general, but, other aspects 
of matters have a bearing thereon. In the cases, like 
Railroad v. Stringham, 38 Utah 113, 110 Pacific 868, af-
firmed on appeal, the question as to adverse possession 
arose between .a settler, who failed to make filings and 
the like; and, what was in effect a grantee of the United 
States, under a right of way selection. Now, as is shown 
by the Shepley case, the federal congress, at all times, 
until final vesting of title by perfection of pre-emption, 
homestead filing, patent, or the like, has a pre-eminent 
power over the public domain. Hence, a railroad right of 
way under a federal grant, would have priority of a mere 
settler on the public domain. Likewise, in the Gonzales 
v. French case, supra, the sole issue .as to whether a set-
tler, never having perfected his rights, is entitled to 
claim as against the townsite entry or patentee under a 
Congressional Act, relating to the same land. Obviously, 
the federal power to control and legislate concerning 
such lands as are still part of the public domain, is a part 
of the national sovereignty which cannot be divested, 
until the settler first OBTAINS a valid VESTED 
interest in some manner to such land. In other situations, 
where two settler claiiuants adverse as to the same tract 
of land, the courts will support the rights of the earliest 
one to make such compliance with federal law, such as 
pre-en1ption, as will give hiiu a valid claim thereto. So 
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much is clear, and is well settled law. BUT NEITHER 
OF THOSE SITUATIONS, is the SITUATION THAT 
EXISTS HERE. Appellant does not deny that the fed-
eral government is the paramount owner of the property 
here, and, could by action of congress, or other lawful 
authority, in the sw.ay of its power, grant the instant 
land away, take it for public use, or otherwise, as against 
appellant. What appellant is claiming is that same being 
feder.al land, since the original settlement, with a "view 
toward pre-emption or homestead" divested any poten-
tial claim of the territory or state, he, the appellant, as 
the successor in interest of a chain of title showing the 
requisite possession, may obtain title to this ground 
under the federal remedial statute(s), (Section 1068, U.S. 
Code Annotated, Title 43, Page 64 Cumulative Annual 
Pocket Part). No pre-emption, or the like is a requisite 
under this statute, nor, is the appellant relying on the 
so-called non-transferable settlers' rights to give him 
any rights, other than as to possessory rights, buttressed 
by the territorial statute mentioned at page 12 of Appel-
lant's Original Brief. 
As pointed out at page 11, in Appellant's Original 
Brief, even this Honorable Court, as indicated in Ham-
blin v State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 
187 Pacific 178, has held th.at the filing of the pre-emption 
rights was directory and not mandatory. Hence, in the 
absence of the special situations mentioned above, where 
there is a controversy between adversely occupying set-
tlers, or between a non-complying settler, and a grantee 
of the government, the government h.as always acted with 
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leniency toward an occupant, and tended to protect his 
rights. True, the settler cannot as a matter of right assert 
his possessory right, unperfected as against his govern-
ment, but, that is not the issue here. The appellant's 
predecessor's initial settlement on the ground herein in 
question, prior to the public survey thereof, barred any 
rights of the territory and later the state from attaching 
to this ground; and so, this court should permit the re-
hearing and reconsideration of this case, enter judgment 
in favor of this plaintiff, appellant, and petitioner, to 
the end that he can pursue his right to obtain title by 
patent, under the federal remedial statutes, freed of any 
adversary claim of the defendants .and respondents, 
since they acquired nothing in the way of title from the 
purported transfer of the alleged rights of the territory 
or state to this potential school land, as such title never 
initially attached to the ground in question. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing, and of the arguments con-
tained in Appellant's Original Brief, appellant and peti-
tioner prays that further consideration be given this 
cause, a rehearing and reconsideration be granted, and, 
that the present opinion be vacated or modified, and 
judgment in favor of the appellant and petitioner, plain-
tiff in the Court below, be entered, and a remand to the 
district court to that effect be made. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. S. JOHNSON 
Attorney for Petitioner, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
